美元霸权进入倒计时？

Club点评：5月20日，北京对话和南方共同主办的“金砖国家货币和金融该体系改革”闭门对话会在京举行。出席会议的北京对话特约专家、联合国南方中心（South Centre)高级顾问李月芬撰文指出，美国根据自己利益转移国内风险，并对其他国家实施制裁，越来越多的国家开始意识到去美元化势在必行，去美元化策略已融入一些国家的政策框架和战略规划之中。 

李月芬参加 “金砖国家货币和金融体系改革”闭门对话会‍

自二战以来，美元当仁不让地占据了国际货币和经济体系的枢纽地位，充当着全球储备货币、交易媒介和记账单位的功能。尽管部分国家和地区曾试图减少对美元的依赖，开启所谓的“去美元化”进程，但这些尝试并未形成广泛共识。美元主导地位及其为美国带来的特权固然引起了一些国家的不满，但迄今为止，“去美元化”的努力尚未取得显著的进展。因此，美元的主导地位和至高无上性依旧是当前全球叙事的组成部分。

然而，当前形势有所不同。对美元主导地位的不满情绪更为广泛，地理上涵盖东南亚、中东和拉丁美洲。近期的去美元化进程也是多管齐下，在不同的领域和渠道都有所展现。尤为关键的是，去美元化策略已融入一些国家的政策框架和战略规划之中。

尽管如此，去美元化趋势并不意味着美元的衰落迫在眉睫，或其影响力已经消退。目前，尚无其他货币能够取代美元。没有实质证据表明美元的主导地位正遭受威胁。

然而，过度依赖美元的负面效应已日益显现，发展中国家首当其冲。许多国家已经开始在贸易计价、外汇储备管理、金融结算方式以及债务发行等领域探寻替代美元的方案。在应对日益加剧的分裂、不断演进的叙事，以及共同追求一个更新、更民主的国际经济秩序的期望中，去美元化似乎反映了国际社会从单极世界走向多极世界的愿景和行动。

去美元化的经济逻辑

当前，除了各国政府之外，投资者也在重新评估美元在全球经济中的作用及其对全球金融体系的影响。去美元化并非一时的心血来潮，这股浪潮背后有着深刻的经济缘由。

图源：互联网

首先，自二战以来，美国在世界上的经济权重不断下降，美元的主导地位却日益强化，这种不对称性引发了对全球金融稳定性的普遍担忧。

美元在国际外汇储备、全球贸易计价、国际债务证券和跨境贷款中的份额比美国在全球国内生产总值（GDP）和国际贸易中所占的份额高出数倍。正如纽约储蓄银行研究员阿金奇（Akinci）等学者所指出，“美国实际经济对全球发展的敞口不断缩小，而美元在世界上发挥的作用不断增强，两者存在着根本的不对称性.....这种不对称性的根源在于美元的主导地位日益增强，尽管美国经济在全球GDP和全球贸易中的重要性都在减弱。” 

自二战以来，一国在全球GDP的占比从大约45%下降至约25%，然而，在世界经济运行中，该国仍然承担着与其实力不相称的责任，这种潜在风险何等惊人。权力的高度集中似乎让其他国家感到不安。许多学者亦认为，当前以美元为主导的国际金融体系，过度倾斜美国利益，难以长久维系。纽约大学荣誉教授、经济学家鲁比尼（Nouriel Roubini）认为，“迟早会出现一种替代方案，以纠正自1971年尼克松冲击（Nixon shock）以来延续至今的失衡局面。

图源：世界银行

其他国家，尤其是对于对外部冲击承受能力较弱的发展中国家，对美国将美元武器化以推行外交政策，以及将美国经济利益凌驾于世界其他地区之上的做法，有着切肤之痛。正如尼克松总统的财政部长约翰·B·康纳利（John B. Connally）所言，“美元是我们的货币，却是你们的麻烦。”美元作为一种国家货币，美国有充分的主权来作出具有全球影响力的货币和财政决策。然而，国际社会尚无机制能促使美国与其他将承受决策溢出效应影响的国家磋商，国际货币体系也缺乏约束储备货币发行国的能力。这无疑是一个全球性难题。

其次，外界担心美元会将资源从边缘国家转移到美国。美元的主导地位使得世界对美元的需求上升，纷纷将美元视为外汇储备和投资的安全资产。此类嚣张特权使美国常常能够以较低的回报率进口外国商品和服务，而美国支持的资本（包括利息收入、投资组合股票头寸和其他以美元计价的资本出口）回流到世界其他地区时，却能使美国获得相当可观的回报。

一些学者已经证明，美国的净外国资产头寸已获得了可观的平均超额回报。美国经济研究机构NBER研究员古林查斯（Gourinchas）和雷伊（Rey）指出，美国的对外负债几乎全部是美元计价，而美国约70%的外国资产是外币。因此，在其他条件不变的情况下，美元贬值10%就意味着世界其他地区向美国转移了美国GDP的约5.9%。两人还指出，在1952年至2004年期间，得益于美元的特殊地位，全球向美国的间接资本转移“从1952年的0.3上升到1973年的0.73，1991年达到1.09，并最终在2004年达到1.34”。

另一方面，联合国贸发会议（UNCTAD）高级经济学家梅耶尔（Mayer）强调，“2010-2019年，发展中经济体整体经历了负回报差异和估值损失。这表明，发展中经济体与发达经济体之间的总回报差异约为负3个百分点，发展中经济体每年平均向外转移的资源约为8000亿美元，相当于其GDP的3.3%”。

图源：国际清算银行2022年第二季度数据（路透社）

得益于这些优势，美国经常账户和财政赤字的负面冲击在不同程度上得到了缓释。换言之，美元的至高无上的地位使得美国能够维持超出其GDP允许范围的生活方式。然而，这可能引发全球经济失衡，持续出现贸易顺差的国家可能变得脆弱，譬如，这些国家会被困在出口国际供应链的大宗商品或低端产品之中。持续且巨额的贸易顺差意味着国内储蓄过多或抑制消费过度，进一步导致国内投资生产率下降、外汇储备中以美元计价的安全资产增加。

借助美元，美国能在全球市场廉价融资、在国内低成本制造货币，继而以更高的回报率回笼美元，这是美元赋予美国的特权。然而，美元特权不止于此。

对俄罗斯实施的制裁引发了国际社会对美国政府可能利用美元的全球主导地位来实现其外交政策目标的担忧。目前，美国已经制裁了大约40个国家。部分去美元化行动是由于大家不知哪个国家或哪家企业将会成为下一个制裁目标。

图源：美国财政部网站‍‍

去美元化模式

自二战落幕以来，全球贸易一直以美元为基础。尽管实际的贸易往来可能与美国无关，但大多数商品仍以美元定价交易。毫无疑问，去美元化进程中一个显著趋势是使用替代货币进行贸易计价。

过去的20年间，全球多国央行致力于实现投资组合多元化，以摆脱对美元的过度依赖。自20世纪之交以来，美元在全球外汇储备中的占比已下降超过10个百分点。相较于1977年85%的峰值，美元在全球外汇储备中所占份额已大幅滑落。

为寻求美元之外的避险资产，各国央行纷纷增持黄金和其他货币。全球央行的黄金购买量一度达到全球月度黄金需求的33%的峰值，推动了金价的大幅攀升。2022年，全球央行的黄金购买量创下了1089吨的纪录，这是自1950年有记录以来的最高水平。

目前，全球跨境支付基础设施主要由环球银行金融电信协会（SWIFT）和美国的清算所银行同业支付系统（CHIPS）所主导，在促进国际金融交易和维护储备货币的主导地位方面发挥着关键作用，同时也是实施金融制裁的重要工具。尽管中国、俄罗斯、法国、德国和英国已经开发了一些替代系统，但这些系统尚未得到广泛采用。

中国、印度和南非等国已然开启本币国际化进程。伴随央行数字货币（CBDCs）的问世，这些货币也被用于加速跨境交易结算。据国际货币基金组织（IMF）统计，截至2022年7月，全球近百种CBDCs处于研发阶段，其中两种已全面投入使用。诸多国家正积极测试数字货币，旨在贸易结算中启用本币。CBDCs不仅有望降低这些国家对美元的依赖，更将助推金融数字化转型。

图源：互联网

结论

尽管美元在全球央行外汇储备中的比重有所下降，但其主导地位尚在。

根据国际清算银行（BIS）的数据，美元在贸易计价和国际外汇交易中的地位依然坚如磐石，占全球外汇交易的近90%，2022年的交易额约为6.6万亿美元。全球大约50%的全球贸易额以美元计价，远高于美国在世界贸易中的实际占比。

债务工具方面，最近美元在国际债券发行中的使用量显著上升。BIS的数据显示，自2010年以来，以美元计价的外币债务比率一直稳定在60%左右。而在跨境支付领域中，超过90%的交易通过SWIFT系统进行，这表明SWIFT几乎处于绝对垄断地位。

综上所述，近期的去美元化努力虽然具有广泛的基础，但这并不意味着美元即将丧失其主导地位。去美元化进程面临的最大挑战在于，目前尚无任何替代货币能够完全满足成为全球主要储备货币的标准，兼具价值储存、支付媒介和交易手段的功能。

然而，随着人们对去美元化背后的经济和地缘政治逻辑的认识日益加深，特别是考虑到主要的发展中国家一直站在去美元化进程的前沿，去美元化浪潮似乎已不可阻挡。

【翻译/ 杨昕妤】

以下为英文原文：

The centrality of the US dollar in international monetary and economic systems since World War II has been overwhelming. It is a reserve currency, medium of exchange and unit of account. Some countries and regions have historically attempted to reduce their reliance on the dollar, dubbed de-dollarization. But none of these attempts were broad-based. Unhappiness with the dollar’s dominance and the power it grants Washington has been obvious, but none of the de-dollarization efforts to date have achieved meaningful outcomes. Therefore, the dominance and supremacy of the US dollar still comprise the current global narrative.

However, this time it is different. Discontent over the dollar’s supremacy is more widespread, geographically covering Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. Recent de-dollarization processes have also been multi-pronged, manifesting in different areas and channels. Above all, de-dollarization has become part of the policies and strategies of some countries.

But de-dollarization efforts do not mean the dollar’s demise is imminent or the currency’s sway has ended. Currently, there is no good alternative to the dollar. No substantial evidence demonstrates that the dollar’s supreme status is under threat.

Nevertheless, the disadvantages of over-reliance on the dollar have been keenly felt, especially by developing countries. Many countries have started searching for alternatives to the dollar in trade invoicing, foreign-exchange (forex) reserves, modes of financial clearance, debt issuances, etc. De-dollarization also seems to reflect the sentiments and efforts of moving from a unipolar world toward a multipolar world in the face of deepening fragmentation, changing narratives and aspirations toward a new and more democratic international economic order.

Economic rationale for de-dollarization

Currently, not only states but also investors have been reassessing the dollar’s role in the global economy and its implications for the world’s financial system. De-dollarization is not a mood swing; there are economic reasons behind this trend.

First, the asymmetry between the shrinking US economic weight in the world since World War II and the dollar’s growing dominant role has given rise to concerns related to global financial stability.

The US dollar’s shares in international foreign reserves, global trade invoicing, international debt securities and cross-border loans are many times greater than the United States’ shares of global gross domestic product (GDP) and international trade. As Akinci et al. pointed out, “There is a fundamental asymmetry between the shrinking exposure of the real U.S. economy to global developments versus the growing global role of the U.S. dollar.…. The asymmetry relies on [the] growing dominant role of the U.S. dollar while the U.S. economy is shrinking its importance both in terms of its weight as a share of global GDP and as a share of global trade.”

It is mind-boggling to think about the potential risks of one country, with its share of global GDP reduced from around 45 percent to approximately 25 percent since World War II, still shouldering an oversized burden or responsibility for the performance of the world’s economy. Such a concentration of power in one country seems frightening to the rest of the world. Many scholars also believe the current dollar-dominated international financial system is skewed in the United States’ favor and is unsustainable. Nouriel Roubini stated that "sooner or later, an alternative will have to emerge to correct this imbalance that has been continuing since the Nixon shock in 1971!"

Actions to weaponize the dollar for the promotion of US foreign policies or to put US economic interests above the rest of the worlds have been keenly felt, even suffered, by other countries, particularly developing countries, as their resilience to external shocks is weak. As John B. Connally, President Richard Nixon’s treasury secretary, said, “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem." The dollar is a national currency, and the United States has full sovereignty to make monetary and fiscal decisions with global implications. Yet, there is no mechanism to compel a national government to consult with other countries that will be at the receiving end of the spill-over effects of its decisions. Nor does the international monetary system have the leverage to discipline the issuing countries of reserve currencies. This is indeed the world’s problem.

Secondly, there are concerns over transferring resources via the dollar from the periphery to the United States. The supremacy of the US dollar gives rise to global demand for it as a safe asset for foreign reserves and investments. This exorbitant dollar advantage allows the US to import foreign goods and services more often than not at low rates of return when compared to the sizeable excess return on US-backed capital exported back to the rest of the world, including interest income, portfolio equity positions and other capital exports in dollars.

Some scholars have demonstrated that the US earns an important average excess return on its net foreign asset position. Gourinchas and Rey pointed out that US foreign liabilities are almost entirely in dollars, whereas approximately 70 percent of US foreign assets are in foreign currencies. Therefore, a 10-percent dollar depreciation represents, ceteris paribus, a transfer of around 5.9 percent of US GDP from the rest of the world to the United States. They went on to show that for the period 1952-2004, the indirect capital transfer from the world to the US owing to the special dollar status was “0.3 in 1952 to 0.73 in 1973, reached 1.09 in 1991 and, finally, 1.34 in 2004”.

Mayer, on the other hand, pointed out that “developing economies as a group recorded negative return differentials and valuation losses during 2010-2019, implying a total return differential of about minus three percentage points between developing and developed economies and an annual average resource transfer from developing economies of about $800bn, or 3.3 per cent of their GDP".

Benefiting from these advantages, the negative impacts of the current US account and fiscal deficits tend to be muted to various degrees for the country. In other words, the US can afford to live beyond what its national GDP permits because of the dollar’s supremacy. However, this can give rise to global economic imbalances and vulnerabilities for countries that persistently run trade surpluses, including being trapped in exporting the international supply chain’s commodities or low-end products. Huge and persistent trade surpluses mean excessive domestic savings or suppression of consumption, resulting in less productive domestic investment and increasing foreign-exchange reserves in safe assets that are largely in dollars.

To borrow money cheaply in global markets and create it inexpensively domestically, then recycle dollars at higher returns, is one privilege granted to the US by its dollar. However, dollar privileges go beyond this.

The imposition of sanctions on Russia has triggered the fear of Washington using the dollar’s global dominance as a vehicle for its foreign-policy aims. Currently, the US has sanctioned approximately 40 countries. Some de-dollarization actions are in response to concerns over which country or enterprise will be the next sanctions target.

Modes of de-dollarization

Global trade has been based on the dollar since the end of World War II. Most commodities are priced and traded in US dollars, even though the actual trade may have nothing to do with the United States. Unsurprisingly, an important trend in de-dollarization has been to use alternative currencies for trade invoicing.

In the past two decades, many countries’ central banks have attempted to diversify their portfolios to shift away from the US dollar. Since the turn of the millennium, the share of the US dollar in global foreign-exchange reserves has declined by more than 10 percentage points. Compared with its peak of 85 percent in 1977, the US dollar’s slide in global foreign-exchange reserves has been significant.

In seeking a safe alternative to the dollar, central banks have been turning to gold and other currencies. The purchase of gold by central banks has reached a peak of 33 percent of the monthly global demand for gold, contributing to the sharp increase in the price of gold. 2022 saw central banks purchase a record amount of gold of 1,089 tons, the most since records began in 1950.

The global cross-border payments infrastructure, dominated by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) and the United States’ Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), is essential for international financial activities and the realization of the dominant positions of reserve currencies; it is also an important vehicle for the imposition of financial sanctions. A few alternative systems have been developed by China, Russia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, but they are not yet widely used.

China, India and South Africa are among the countries that have started to internationalize their currencies. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) have also been developed to help speed up settlements of cross-border transactions. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as of July 2022, there were nearly 100 CBDCs in research or development stages, and two have been fully launched. Many countries are testing these digital currencies with the aim, among others, of using them in trade transactions in their own currencies. CBDCs can potentially reduce their countries’ reliance on the dollar in addition to digitalizing financing.

Conclusions

Even though the dollar’s share of the world’s central banks’ foreign-exchange reserves has declined, it is still dominant.

For trade invoicing and international transactions of foreign exchange, the dollar’s position has remained stable, at the level of almost 90 percent of global forex transactions, representing about $6.6 trillion in 2022, according to Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data. About 50 percent of global trade is invoiced in the dollar, even though the United States’ real share in world trade is much less.

Regarding debt instruments, the dollar has recently significantly increased in international bond issuance. According to the BIS, foreign-currency debt denominated in US dollars has remained around 60 percent since 2010. Regarding cross-border transmissions, more than 90 percent passed through SWIFT, suggesting an almost ab-solute monopoly.

Overall, recent developments in de-dollarization, even though broad-based, do not point to any imminent loss of the US dollar’s dominance. The biggest challenge to de-dollarization is that no single alternative currency meets the criteria for being the worlds leading reserve currency, a store of value, and a medium and means of payment.

However, owing to the increasing awareness of the economic and geopolitical rationales for de-dollarization and the fact that major developing countries have been at the forefront of the movement, the trend toward further de-dollarization seems unstoppable.

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